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First Time for Everything: The CFPB Enforces Data
Security
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In March 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”) filed its first data security enforcement action against Iowabased fintech firm, Dwolla, Inc. (“Dwolla”).1 The consent order
resulting from this action details how Dwolla’s data security statements
were deceptive, and orders Dwolla to implement a host of new
measures aimed at better protecting its customers’
personal
2
information. This action raises many new questions surrounding the
CFPB’s role in policing data security, and how this agency’s actions
will compare to those pursued by other regulators, including the
similarly situated Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).3 In the absence
of further actions and guidance, “covered persons”4 should look to the
recommendations outlined in the Dwolla consent order, because, as of
now, it remains the most useful source for predicting how the CFPB
will regulate data security in the future.5
Financial institutions often possess vast amounts of consumer
information, the value of which places them amongst the most popular
targets for cyber attack.6 On the black market credit card numbers can
1. Dwolla, Inc. CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0007 *1 (Mar. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Dwolla
Consent Order].
2. Id.
3. See WILL DURBIN & YENISEY RODRIGUEZ, PAUL WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON &
GARRISON LLP, THE CFPB ENTERS THE CYBERSECURITY ARENA WITH ITS FIRST
ENFORCEMENT
ACTION
4
(2016),
https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3377203/4mar16cyberalert.pdf.
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1002, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2015) (“The term ‘covered person’ means—(A) any person that
engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service; and (B) any
affiliate of a person described in subparagraph (A) if such affiliate acts as a service provider
to such person.”).
5. See Durbin & Rodriguez, supra note 3, at 4 (“Among other sources, companies
should look to the remedial actions that the CFPB required of Dwolla for guidance on how
to strengthen their systems.”).
6. IBM,
2016
COST
OF
DATA
BREACH
STUDY
7
(2016),
https://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/se/en/sel03094usen/SEL03094USEN.PDF.
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sell for $15 each, while more comprehensive “Fullz”7 information
packages can sell for twice that.8 As a result of storing such valuable
information, companies in the financial sector experience above average
remediation costs when data breaches do occur.9 Industry observers
note that the occurrence rate of data breaches is increasing, with 554
million consumer records compromised in the first half of 2016 alone.10
Over the course of the last decade, the average cost of corporate data
breaches has also increased, from $3.5 million in 2006 to an estimated
$7 million in 2016.11 Nearly 15% of this cost is associated with legal
defense services, while a loss of customer confidence accounts for about
40% of the cost.12
Preventing these attacks can be difficult, as cybercriminals are
constantly adapting their methods of attack.13 While the recent shift to
EMV14 credit card chip technology has improved the security of cardpresent transactions, this change has also had the unanticipated effect of
increasing the amount of digital financial fraud.15 Experts predict that
cybercriminals will begin to shift focus to the financial sector’s growing
number of non-traditional institutions, such as mobile payment systems
7. “Fullz” includes “identity information, which can include full name, email address
and password, physical address, phone number, date of birth, Social Security Number,
driver’s license number, bank name, bank account number, bank routing number, victim
employer’s name.” LILLIAN ABLON ET AL., RAND CORP., MARKETS FOR CYBERCRIME
TOOLS AND
STOLEN
DATA
49
(2014),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR610/RAND_RR61
0.pdf.
8. CHARLES MCFARLAND ET AL., MCAFEE, THE HIDDEN DATA ECONOMY 5 (2015),
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-hidden-dataeconomy.pdf?clickid=RsiVUn3BAVPg1wUwJ52—
UvmUkkTQ5zExAN380&lqmcat=Affiliate:IR:null:74047:10078:10078:null&sharedid=.
9. See IBM, supra note 6, at 7 (illustrating that the financial industry has an above
average per capita breach cost)
10. Gemalto Releases Findings of First Half 2016 Breach Level Index, GEMALTO
(September 20, 2016) http://www.gemalto.com/press/Pages/Gemalto-releases-findings-offirst-half-2016-Breach-Level-Index.aspx.
11. IBM, supra note 6, at 6.
12. IBM, supra note 6, at 16.
13. See Penny Crossman, Are You Ready for the Cybersecurity Challenges of 2016?,
AM. BANKER (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/are-you-ready-for-thecybersecurity-challenges-of-2016 (writing how new technologies can spur new methods of
cyberattack).
14. EMV stands for Europay, MasterCard and Visa, which have collectively developed
the new standard credit cards, which utilize harder-to-counterfeit chips rather than
traditional magnetic strips. Oren Levy, Europay, MasterCard, Visa: A Primer, TECHCRUCH
(May 12, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/05/12/europay-mastercard-visa-a-primer/.
15. Crossman, supra note 13.
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and transfer products.16
The CFPB was established in 2011 as part of the Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).17
The purpose of the CFPB is to enforce federal consumer financial laws
on behalf of consumers, and to ensure that markets for consumer
financial products and services are “fair, transparent, and
competitive.”18 Interpreting this delegation of power broadly, the CFPB
regulates traditional financial institutions in addition to a diverse range
of groups traditionally conceptualized as being non-financial (i.e.
merchants, retailers, and real estate agents.)19 The CFPB also has
authority to police a variety of “enumerated consumer laws,” including
the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, the Truth in Savings Act, and the
Consumer Leasing Act.20 In addition, the CFPB has the primary
authority to enforce federal consumer financial laws over depository
institutions with assets greater than $10 billion.21
This Note analyzes the implications of the Dwolla enforcement
action, and proceeds in four parts. Part II examines the findings and
recommendations made by the CFPB in the Dwolla Consent Order.22
Part III outlines how other federal and state regulators have policed data
security, with a focus on the FTC’s enforcement.23 Finally, Parts IV
and V discuss the practical implications of Dwolla and the steps that
financial institutions should take to avoid similar enforcement actions.24

Crossman, supra note 13.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2015) (establishing the purpose, objectives, and function of the
CFPB).
18. Dodd-Frank § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2015); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
AND
EXAMINATION
MANUAL
(Oct.
2012)
CFPB SUPERVISION
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manualv2.pdf.
19. Dodd-Frank § 1024, 12 USC § 5514 (2015); MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, THE
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT TO EXPECT (Jan. 2012),
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/lit_whitepaper_consumerfinancialprotectionbureau_jan
2012.pdf at 5.
20. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, THE DODD-FRANK ACT ESTABLISHES THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU AS THE PRIMARY REGULATOR OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 2 (July 2010), http://files.arnoldporter.com/advisory—the_doddfrank_act_establishes_the_consumer_financial_protection_bureau_071510.pdf.
21. Id. at 6.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part IV & V.
16.
17.
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II. DWOLLA GOES FIRST
Founded in 2010, Dwolla offers digital money transferring
services similar to those provided by PayPal and Venmo.25 Dwolla users
can transfer money both to and from accounts managed entirely online,
accessible through a variety of digital platforms.26 The money stored in
a Dwolla account can be transferred directly to the consumer’s bank
account or stored indefinitely in the user’s Dwolla-managed account.27
The money stored in Dwolla-managed accounts is held in bank accounts
managed by Compass Bank and Veridian Credit Union.28 When users
register for an account, they are asked to provide
their name, address, date of birth, and Social Security number.29 This
information is stored by Dwolla both for communication purposes and
for use in subsequent transactions.30 Customers are asked to provide a
routing number and an account number if they elect to link a separate
bank account.31 At the time of this enforcement action, Dwolla had
approximately 653,000 users and was transferring approximately $5
million a day.32
The main assertion of the CFPB’s enforcement action is that
Dwolla engaged in “deceptive acts and practices relating to false
representation regarding respondent’s data security practices in
violation of Sections 1031(a) and 1036(a)(1) of the Consumer Financial
Protection Act of 2010.”33
After establishing jurisdiction and definitions, the consent order
summarizes the findings of the CFPB’s investigation of Dwolla’s data
security policy.34 The deceptive acts at issue in this matter took place
from January 2011 to March 2014.35 Seven deceptive representations
25.

Our Story, DWOLLA, INC., https://www.dwolla.com/press (last visited Jan. 24,

2017).
Id.
Id.
DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *4.
DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *4.
See DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *4 (establishing what contact
information Dwolla user’s must provide during registration).
31. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *4.
32. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *5.
33. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *1.
34. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *1–10 (“The Bureau has jurisdiction
over this matter under Sections 1053 and 1055 of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5563 and 5565.”).
35. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *5.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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are listed, all of which were claims made by Dwolla on its website.36
These representations included claims that customer data was “securely
encrypted and stored,” and that Dwolla utilized “the latest encryption
and secure connections” technologies.37 Elsewhere, Dwolla claimed its
security practices “exceed[ed] industry standards” and set “a new
precedent for the industry for safety and security.”38
The consent order also details a simulated attack previously
conducted by Dwolla during which 62% of its employees clicked on a
vulnerable link, and 25% of its employees gave up access to customer
information.39 Despite these results, Dwolla failed to train employees or
take any other affirmative steps to prevent such attacks.40 The CFPB
does not allege that an actual data breach took place, nor does it allege
anyone ever attempted to retrieve consumer data from Dwolla’s
servers.41
The CFPB issued Dwolla a $100,000 penalty, which is an
extraordinarily low figure compared to monetary penalties issued by the
CFPB in the past.42 All of the penalties resulting from this action went
into the CFPB’s general Civil Penalty Fund, which is used to
compensate victims in other enforcement actions brought by the
agency.43 To put this figure in perspective, in 2014 over 40% of the
CFPB’s actions resulted in penalties in excess of $5 million, with two
exceeding $10 million.44 One of the CFPB’s largest settlements came in
2007 when Bank of America agreed to pay $727 million for a variety of
violations, including deceptive marketing of its credit card products.45
DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *6.
DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *6.
DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *5.
DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *8.
DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *8.
See DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *8 (failing to mention any breaches
or attempts to breach Dwolla’s servers).
42. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *16.
43. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *16; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
Civil
Penalty
Fund,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/payments-harmedconsumers/civil-penalty-fund/.
44. JOSEPH L. BARLOON, ANAND S. RAMAN & AUSTIN K. BROWN, SKADDEN, ARPS,
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, CFPB DEFINES ‘UNFAIR,’ ‘DECEPTIVE’ AND ‘ABUSIVE’
THROUGH
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIVITY
(Jan.
2015),
PRACTICES
https://www.skadden.com/insights/cfpb-defines-unfair-deceptive-and-abusive-practicesthrough-enforcement-activity.
45. CFPB Orders Bank of America to Pay $727 Million in Consumer Relief for Illegal
9, 2014),
Credit Card Practices, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Apr.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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Alternatively, the relatively small penalty issued to Dwolla could be due
to the unprecedented nature of this action.46 Furthermore, the small
penalty potentially could have been strategic, in that it may have
discouraged Dwolla from litigating the validity of this unprecedented
action.47
For Dwolla, implementing the changes mandated in the consent
order will likely exceed the cost of the monetary fine.48 The order
somewhat broadly instructs Dwolla to “adopt and implement reasonable
and appropriate data security measures to protect consumers’ personal
information.”49 The CFPB further requires that Dwolla “improve the
safety and security of its operations and the consumer information that
is stored on, or transmitted through its networks.”50 To accomplish
these improvements the consent order provides some specific steps that
Dwolla must take, including the establishment of a data security plan
and the hiring of “a qualified person” to coordinate and account for
Dwolla’s data security.51 The consent order also requires Dwolla to
conduct two annual network security assessments, after which any
identified issues are remedied.52
The order further provides that Dwolla must report certain
information to the CFPB for a period of at least five years.53 These
reports must include a list of employees handling data security issues as
well as any training materials, risk assessments, or advertisements
relating to data security.54 While five years of reporting may seem
excessive, it pales in comparison to data security actions brought by
other agencies, some of which consist of decades of direct supervision.55

http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-bank-of-america-to-pay727-million-in-consumer-relief-for-illegal-credit-card-practices/.
46. See DURBIN & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3 (stressing the fact that this is the first data
security related action brought by the CFPB).
47. See DURBIN & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3
48. See DURBIN & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3 (listing the multiple steps that have to be
taken by Dwolla to comply with the consent order).
49. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *11.
50. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *11.
51. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *12.
52. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *12.
53. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *19.
54. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *19–20.
55. See Fandango, Credit Karma Settle FTC Charges That They Deceived Consumers
by Failing to Securely Transmit Sensitive Personal Information, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
(Mar. 28, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/03/fandango-credit-
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In the short term, the order instructs Dwolla to submit a
compliance report within 90 days,56 and conduct a data security audit
within 180 days.57 During the audit, Dwolla must allow a “qualified
person” to evaluate the effectiveness of the policies being implemented,
who will then report whether Dwolla is complying with the consent
order.58 In the event that the requirements of this consent order are not
met, there are procedures by which the CFPB can extend the duration of
its supervision.59
III. REGULATING IN A CROWDED FIELD
The legal landscape governing data security is crowded, with
forty-seven laws relating to data breach notification alone.60 Relevant
to financial institutions, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”), Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”), and Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) all regulate data security in some
capacity.61 Collectively, these agencies have acted on data security in
their roles as members of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (“FFIEC”).62 These agencies have also issued independent data
security guidance and regulations, the focus of which varies based on
their respective powers and jurisdiction.63

karma-settle-ftc-charges-they-deceived-consumers.
56. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *14, 18.
57. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *12.
58. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *14.
59. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *15-16.
60. Judith Germano, Proposed New York Cybersecurity Regulation: A Giant Leap
(Dec.
2,
2016,
2:32
PM),
Backward?,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/12/02/proposed-ny-cybersecurity-regulation-agiant-leap-backward/#61367f462e78.
61. See, e.g., Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Agencies Issue
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards
(Oct.19, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20161019a.htm
(discussing a recent proposed rule set forth by these agencies).
62. DEBOVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, CLIENT UPDATE: FEDERAL FINANCIAL REGULATORS
TO PROPOSE ENHANCED CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARDS (Oct. 25, 2016),
http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2016/10/20161025_federal_fi
nancial_regulators_to_propose_enhanced_cyber_risk_management_standards.pdf.
63. See, e.g., JEFFREY SACKS, CROWE HORWATH LLP, FDIC INTREX PROGRAM IS HERE
(Sept.
6
2016),
http://www.crowehorwath.com/cybersecurity-watch/fdic-intrexprogram/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Crowe
CybersecurityWatch+%28Crowe+Cybersecurity+Watch%29 (discussing a program
instituted by the FDIC, applying narrowly to insitutions covered by that agency).

284

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 21

Notably, the FFIEC recently issued data security guidance
requiring large financial institutions64 to implement “enhanced
standards” for data security.65 This guidance recognizes current
regulations,66 and mandates that certain large institutions go even
further.67 Many of the requirements in this guidance are specific and
technical in nature. One such requirement is that companies establish a
two-hour Recovery Time Objective (“RTO”), during which they
recover all compromised data and restore systems in the event of a data
breach.68 In 2005, the FFIEC published The Interagency Final
Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice.69 Scholars have criticized this
publication as only providing limited practical steps, and failing to lay
out the definitive guidance the industry needs.70
Some of the most notable regulations at the federal level have
come in response to the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999,
known more commonly as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”). 71
Title V of the GLBA addresses the potential dangers that financial
mergers create for non-public consumer information, and requires that
federal agencies establish administrative, technical, and physical

64. Applying to holding companies with total assets exceeding $50 billion, companies
that manage financial market infrastructure, and nonbank financial companies covered by
the Federal Reserve Board. Including the FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool and the
NIST Cybersecurity Framework. FED. RESERVE SYS., ENHANCED CYBER RISK
MANAGEMENT
STANDARDS
11
(Oct.19,
2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20161019a1.pdf.
65. Id. at 1.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 11 (“Similar to the NIST CSF, the enhanced standards would provide a clear
set of objectives for sound cyber risk management. However, the binding requirements set
forth in the enhanced standards would be designed specifically to address the cyber risks of
the largest, most interconnected U.S. financial entities.”).
68. Id. at 41.
69. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to
Customer Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15736 (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 30, 208, 225, 364, 568, and 570).
70. See ALEJANDRO H. CRUZ & CRAIG A. NEWMAN, PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB &
TYLER LLP, OCC’S CYBERSECURITY REGULATORY EXPECTATIONS (Jan. 7, 2016),
https://datasecuritylaw.com/occs-cybersecurity-regulatory-expectations-a-call-to-action/
(explaining how past OCC guidance was primarily found in documents published
collectively in their capacity as members of the FFIEC).
71. Financial Services Modernization Act (“Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act”) § 1093(1), 15
U.S.C. § 6801 (2015). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/privacy/glba/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
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controls for protecting this information.72 Specifically, the GLBA
requires federal agencies to implement safeguards for financial
institutions that ensure the security of customer information, protect
against anticipated threats, and prevent unauthorized access that could
result in substantial harm or inconvenience to customers.73 GLBA was
amended in 2010 to explicitly exclude the CFPB from the list of
agencies required to implement the law.74
The FDIC issued its own data security recommendations in
1996, three years prior to the passing of the GLBA.75 The jurisdiction
of the FDIC is broad, extending over all banks and saving associations
that participate in the FDIC insurance program.76 This agency’s
guidance has often concerned specific technical issues relevant at the
time, addressing issues as narrow as the dangers of employee instant
messaging at banks.77 To monitor cybersecurity, the FDIC utilizes
regulatory and intelligence reports in addition to identifying issues at
specific banks through the FDIC examination process.78 The FDIC may
use enforcement actions against institutions that fail to remedy issues
identified during these examinations.79 In 2015, the FDIC implemented
a new Information Technology Risk Examination (“InTREx”) program
that updates previous examination techniques by placing an increased
focus on data security, particularly in regard to emerging technologies
such as mobile banking.80 With approximately two decades of FDIC
guidance on security, many institutions insured by the FDIC already

72. Gramm-Leach Bliley Act § 1093(1), 15 U.S.C. § 6801.
73. Id. at § 6801(b).
74. Id.
75. Cybersecurity and Information Security: FDIC Financial Institution Letters, FED.

DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/risk/it-security.html
(last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
76. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 1814(a) (2015).
77. See Regulatory Guidance: Cybersecurity and Information Security: FDIC
DEPOSIT
INS.
CORP.,
Financial
Institution
Letters,
FED.
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/risk/it-security.html (listing the specific
titles of past FDIC letters relating to data security) (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
78. A Framework for Cybersecurity, 12 SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS 7, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
2015),
CORP. (Dec.
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwin15/SI_Winter2015
.pdf.
79. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL II-1.1 (Dec.
2015) https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/2/II-1.1.pdf.
80. Sacks, supra note 63.

286

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 21

have sophisticated data security policies in place.81
While certainly less involved than the FDIC, the FRB has also
regulated data security with a strong consumer-based approach.82 The
FRB’s guidance began in response to the requirements found the
GLBA.83 These original provisions made no mention of digital threats,
but more generally instructed covered entities to have written
information protection plans in place that included physical safeguards
“appropriate to the size and complexity of the bank and the nature of its
activities.”84 Beyond this initial guidance, the vast majority of the
guidance issued by the Federal Reserve has been published in
cooperation with its FFIEC counterparts.85
Finally, the OCC has been somewhat active in ensuring data
security for the national banks and federal savings associations under its
jurisdiction.86 The OCC unilaterally issues semi-annual risk
assessments for federally chartered institutions, which in recent years
have highlighted data security as a primary concern.87 The most recent
OCC risk assessment notes that the threat of cyber attack is increasing
as banks continue to adopt new digital technologies, and goes on to note
specific dangers, such as criminal use of virtual currencies to hide
identity.88 Much like its FFIEC counterparts, the majority of recent data
security regulation from OCC has come in the form of interagency

81. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 77 (establishing general procedures that
businesses should follow in regards to data security).
82. See Supervisory Policy and Guidance Topics, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/topics/info_security.htm (last
visited Jan. 24, 2017) (listing multiple policy letters relating to customer security).
83. Id.
84. INTERAGENCY GUIDELINES ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR SAFEGUARDING
CUSTOMER
INFORMATION,
FED.
RESERVE
SYS.
(2001),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2001/sr0115a1.pdf.
85. Id.; See Supervisory Policy and Guidance Topics: Information Security, FED.
RESERVE BD., https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/topics/info_security.htm (last
visited Jan. 24, 2017) (listing the policy letters relating to information security published by
the FFIEC)
86. About the OCC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html (last
visited Jan. 24, 2017).
87. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, SEMIANNUAL RISK PERSPECTIVE 7
(2016), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publicationsreports/semiannual-risk-perspective/semiannual-risk-perspective-spring-2016.pdf
(explaining how cyber attacks are one of the primary threats to financial institutions,
especially large banks).
88. Id. at 7–8.
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FFIEC guidance.89
In addition to federal regulations, many financial institutions
must abide by state-issued rules.90 In 2016, the state of New York
published a proposed rule that, if codified, will make New York the first
state to regulate data security at financial institutions.91 Some of the
most noteworthy requirements set forth in the proposal include
requiring a written data security program and the designation of a Chief
Information Security Officer responsible for overseeing data security
programs and policies.92 These regulations apply to all financial
services companies including insurance agencies, with limited
exceptions for institutions with fewer than 1000 customers or less than
$10 million in year-end assets.93 Scholars in this field have noted that
state-level regulations could act to create an overly complex web of
regulations that could, in some instances, be self-conflicting.94
Allowing such state regulations could distract the financial industry, and
cause more harm than good to consumers.95 To date, there are no other
proposed state-level regulations for cyber security.96
While the aforementioned financial agencies have taken
significant steps to regulate data security, the FTC has long served as
the primary enforcer in this field.97 Over the course of the last twenty
years the FTC has successfully brought over sixty data security
enforcement actions, utilizing jurisdiction that extends to nearly all

Cruz & Newman, supra note 70.
See Who Regulates My Bank?, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY,
https://www.helpwithmybank.gov/national-banks/national-banks.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2017) (establishing that state chartered banks are also regulated by state regulatory bodies).
91. Greg Farrell, New York Financial Regulator Rolls Out Cybersecurity Proposals,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2016, 11:55 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201609-13/new-york-financial-regulator-rolls-out-cybersecurity-proposals.
92. TIFFANY QUACH, PROSKAUER ROSE LLP, NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL
SERVICES
PROPOSES
CYBERSECURITY
REGULATION
(Nov.
7,
2016),
http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2016/11/articles/cybersecurity/new-york-department-offinancial-services-proposes-cybersecurity-regulation/.
93. Kaleigh Simmons, What New York’s Proposed Cybersecurity Regulations Mean for
(Oct.
5,
2016),
the
Rest
of
the
Industry,
RIPPLESHOT
http://info.rippleshot.com/blog/what-new-yorks-proposed-cybersecurity-regulations-meanfor-the-rest-of-the-industry.
94. Germano, supra note 60.
95. Germano, supra note 60.
96. See Germano, supra note 60 (describing New York as the only state to consider
such a rule).
97. Germano, supra note 60.
89.
90.
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institutions that manage consumer data.98
Analyzing the actions of the FTC is particularly useful in this
context, as the agency’s statutory language governing enforcement is
nearly identical to that of the CFPB.99 More specifically, both agencies
have the authority to bring action against parties engaging in unfair,
deceptive, or abusive acts or practices (“UDAAP”).100 In Dwolla, the
prohibition on deceptive acts and practices was at issue, and therefore
analyzing the FTC’s UDAAP actions can be helpful in understanding
the CFPB’s enforcement action against Dwolla.101
The FTC began policing consumer data security by focusing on
its authority to prevent deception,102 targeting an internet company for
its deceptive collection of user information in 1998.103 Likewise, the
majority of the FTC’s data security enforcement actions have utilized
deception as the primary theory.104 The FTC’s utilization of its UDAAP
authority with regards to data security practices has consistently been
upheld in federal courts.105 For example, in FTC v. Wyndham
Worldwide Corp.,106 Wyndham challenged an FTC action filed in
response to a data breach involving 619,000 customer accounts.107 The
FTC’s evidence indicated that Wyndham failed to use firewalls at
critical network points, and did not utilize encryption for customer data

98. Woodrow Hartzog and Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2236 (2016).
99. MARK TAYLOR, PAYMENTS COMPLIANCE, WHAT DOES THE FIRST CFPB ORDER ON
DATA
SECURITY
COMPLIANCE
SIGNAL?,
2
(Mar.
16,
2016),
http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/1082/doc/payments_compliance__what_does_the_first_cfpb_order_on_data_security_co
.pdf.
100. FEDERAL RESERVE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT SECTION 5: UNFAIR OR
DECEPTIVE
ACTS
OR
PRACTICES
7
(2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/ftca.pdf; Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2015).
101. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a); DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1,
at 4.
102. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 628 (2014) (analyzing trends from 154 privacy related
complaints to form a “common law”).
103. Id. at 599.
104. Id.
105. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 242–43 (3d Cir. 2015)
(upholding the FTC’s data security action against Wyndham Worldwide in the absence of
definitive agency guidance); LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 7575033 *1 (F.T.C. Nov.
13, 2015).
106. Wyndham, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
107. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 242-43.
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files.108 Wyndham claimed that the FTC’s powers over data security
were too broad, and that Wyndham had not been given “fair notice” that
such an action could be brought against them.109 Siding with the FTC,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Wyndham did
in fact have notice as it could “reasonably foresee” UDAAP actions
brought in response to its poor security practices.110 To determine what
Wyndham could “reasonably foresee,” the court employed a costbenefit analysis taken from Wyndham’s perspective, where the cost of
precautions was weighed against the benefits of preventing a breach.111
In FTC v. LabMD,112 the FTC brought action against LabMD
for unfairly failing to prevent unauthorized users from accessing patient
health information.113 In this case LabMD challenged the FTC’s
jurisdiction by asserting that The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996114 (“HIPAA”) was the only data security
statute it must comply with.115 This argument failed as
the
Administrative Court held that, absent direct statutory language,
agency-specific data security laws do not trump the FTC’s UDAAP
powers.116 In ruling, the court held that UDAAP powers are intended to
be broad, defined predominately in the context of FTC precedent.117
In 2007, the FTC issued a guidebook entitled, Protecting
Personal Information: A Guide for Business.118 This guidebook
recommends that companies: avoid collecting nonessential personal
information, restrict employee access to consumer data, test
authentication bypass methods, and patch affiliate third-party
software.119 While this guidance is presented as being non-compulsory,
Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 256.
Id.; Solove & Hartzog, supra note 98, at 2240.
Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 256.
Id.
LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 7575033 *1 (F.T.C. Nov. 13, 2015).
LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 776 F.3d 1275, 1277 (11th Cir 2015).
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) § 264(a),
42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(2) (2015).
115. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 98, at 2243; Order Denying Respondent LabMD’s
Motion to Dismiss at *9, LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 7575033 (F.T.C. Nov. 13,
2015).
116. Id. at *11.
117. Id. at *12.
118. See F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 256 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing
FTC guidance published in 2007).
119. Id.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
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the Wyndham court considered the guidebook as evidence against
Wyndham’s “fair notice” argument.120 While formal FTC guidance
could benefit the industry, scholars have noted that a “case-by-case
approach” is better suited for dealing with the dynamic issues associated
with data security.121
The CFPB has consistently relied upon its UDAAP powers as
its primary enforcement tool.122 The popularity of this tool can be
attributed partly to the large amount of discretion implicit in this broad
statutory language.123 While deception was the only prong of UDAAP
utilized by the CFPB in Dwolla, observers have predicted that, based on
FTC precedent, future actions will likely utilize the unfairness prong.124
Unlike the deceptive prong, Dodd-Frank provides specific explicit
definitions for “unfair” and “abusive” practices.125 Unfairness is found
in situations where the act “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury
to consumers, and in cases where the injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”126 Abusive
practices are defined as those that “materially interfere with the ability
of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial
product or service,” and therefore take unreasonable advantage of the
consumer’s expectations and understanding.127
While Dodd-Frank does not formally define “deceptive,” the
agency has published enforcement manuals describing this term as a
“representation, omission, act, or practice that is likely to mislead the
consumer.”128 The CFPB enforcement manual also holds that evidence
of a consumer already being misled is not required, rather the agency
must simply prove that the practice is likely to mislead “reasonable

120. See id. at 256 (holding that the FTC guidance on cybersecurity did constitute ample
fair notice)
121. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 98, at 2299.
122. BARLOON ET AL., supra note 44.
123. BARLOON ET AL., supra note 44.
124. DURBIN & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3.
125. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)-(d) (2015).
126. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c).
127. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
128. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS: CFPB
V.2
5
(Oct.
2012),
MANUAL
http://www.cfpaguide.com/portalresource/Exam%20Manual%20v%202%20%20UDAAP.pdf.
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consumers.”129 The CFPB utilizes the “four Ps” test to evaluate whether
a policy is likely to mislead reasonable consumers.130 For a written
statement, this test focuses on the prominence of the statement, how the
information is presented, the placement of the information, and the
statement’s proximity to the claim it qualifies.131 Furthermore, a
subsequent truthful disclosure is not sufficient to cure a deceptive act or
promise that occurred in the past.132 The CFPB’s enforcement guide for
deceptive acts and practices cites the FTC’s Policy Statement on
Deception.133
In addition to overlapping enforcement statutes, the CFPB and
the FTC also have overlapping areas of jurisdiction.134 The two
agencies have multiple Memoranda of Mutual Understanding
(“MoUs”), in which they lay out the intricacies of their jurisdictional
overlap.135 Included in their shared powers is the ability to bring
enforcement actions against nonbank providers of financial products.136
These MoUs are intended to prevent duplicative rulemaking and
enforcement.137 These documents also acknowledge that in some
circumstances it may be best that the two agencies coordinate their
enforcement activities.138 To prevent duplicative actions, these MoUs
require a “notice of commencement of investigation” in which the
agencies notify one another of actions that could potentially fall within
their overlapping areas of jurisdiction.139 While these notices are not
public record, it is likely that the CFPB notified FTC of its Dwolla
investigation, as this company seems to fall under the jurisdiction of
both organizations.140

Id.
Id. at 5-6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5 n.10.
E.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau and
the
Fed.
Trade
Comm’n
(Mar.
6,
2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation_agreements/150312ftc-cfpbmou.pdf.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 3.
138. Id. at 4.
139. Id. at 4.
140. Id at 4.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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IV. DWOLLA’S IMPACT MOVING FORWARD
Dodd-Frank does not explicitly require the CFPB to regulate
data security.141 The CFPB’s expansion into data security, therefore,
represents an evolution of the “in connection”142 language found in
Section 1031(a) of Dodd-Frank.143 In this case, the deceptive data
statements were “in connection” with the financial services that Dwolla
provided consumers via its payment network.144
One of the biggest questions Dwolla raises is how the CFPB
will work alongside the FTC in enforcing data security.145 While the
two agencies have acknowledged their overlapping powers, neither has
gone as far as to claim exclusive jurisdiction over a specific industry.146
It is difficult to know whether the CFPB will act merely to supplement
the data security policies the FTC pursues, or whether the CFPB will
implement a different agenda.147 For now, it is fair for companies
subject to overlapping jurisdiction to assume that they may face
enforcement actions from either or both agencies.148
Companies subject to overlapping jurisdiction should take note
of Dwolla, as the CFPB examination powers are far superior to those
held by the FTC.149 These powers apply to all “entities and individuals
141. See ARNOLD AND PORTER, supra note 20, at 1 (describing the areas of the economy
over which the CFPB was delegated authority).
142. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2015) (“The Bureau may take any action authorized under part E to
prevent a covered person or service provider from committing or engaging in an unfair,
deceptive, or abusive act or practice under Federal law in connection with any transaction
with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer
financial product or service.”).
143. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1031(a), 12 USC § 5531(a) (2015).; DAVID A. STEIN & CALEB SKEATH, COVINGTON &
BURLING LLP, CFPB ACTION SENDS WARNING SIGNAL TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 9 (2016),
https://www.cov.com//media/files/corporate/publications/2016/04/cfpb_action_sends_warning_signal_to_financia
l_institutions.pdf;
144. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *4.
145. Michael Gordon et al., BNA Insights: The CFPB and Data Security Enforcement,
106 BANKING REP. (BNA),
No. 23 (June 6,
2016), at
4
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Docume
nts/2016-06-15-BNA-INSIGHTS-The-CFPB-and-Data-Security-Enforcement.pdf.
146. CFPB, supra note 18, at 5.
147. CFPB, supra note 18, at 5.
148. CFPB, supra note 18, at 4.
149. See CFPB, supra note 18 (listing the various investigative tools at the disposal of
the CFPB’s examiners).
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that engage in offering or providing a consumer financial product or
service.”150 Companies meeting this description are required to grant
CFPB examiners access to a wide range of information including
internal policies, audit reports, and training materials.151 In addition to
being able to access these documents, examiners have the right to go onsite to conduct interviews and review documents relevant to their
investigations.152 CFPB examiners may also direct covered entities to
adjust their practices through a separate informal process.153 During
this process, the CFPB examiner shares the findings of his or her
investigation with the institution, and makes recommendations on how
to remedy identified issues.154 While the CFPB prefers self-correction
of these issues, some circumstances require enforcement actions.155 In
this regard, the CFPB’s powers are broader than those of the FTC,
which is generally limited to issuing civil investigative demands.156 In
addition to broader examination powers, the CFPB can also assess
monetary penalties for any UDAAP violation, unlike the FTC, which
can only issue fines in a limited set of circumstances.157
The CFPB’s decision to exercise its powers against Dwolla also
introduces a host of questions.158 The CFPB covers thousands of
companies, some of which likely have similar deceptive data security
statements in place.159 The choice of Dwolla as the first target of its
kind could be motivated by a desire to put companies in the quickly
growing fintech industry on notice.160 The lack of breach or attempted
150. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1024, 12 USC § 5514 (2015).
151. CFPB, supra note 18, at 4.
152. CFPB, supra note 18, at 5.
153. Gordon et. al., supra note 145.
154. CFPB, supra note 18.
155. CFPB, supra note 18.
156. Gordon et al., supra note 145, at 3.
157. Gordon et al., supra note 145, at 3.
158. See John Stewart, In Its First Action on Data Security, the CFPB Hits Dwolla With
a $100,000 Penalty (March 3, 2016), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/news/story/In-ItsFirst-Action-on-Data-Security_-the-CFPB-Hits-Dwolla-With-a-_100_000-Penalty (claiming
that this action should put digital money transferring services on notice).
159. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1024, 12 USC § 5514 (2015); MORGAN LEWIS, WHITE PAPER: THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT TO EXPECT (2012),
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/lit_whitepaper_consumerfinancialprotectionbureau_jan
2012.pdf.
160. John Stewart, supra note 158.
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breach in Dwolla could alternatively signal that the CFPB is focusing
more broadly on ensuring covered entities have comprehensive policies,
even in the absence of specific security threats.161 There have been
recent FTC complaints filed against Credit Karma and Fandango where
deceptive data security practices were also prosecuted without
breach.162 The facts of these cases are similar in that the FTC asserted
that these companies had put customers at risk by misrepresenting their
security policies and failing to take the steps needed to secure their
customer’s information.163
The CFPB’s choice to enforce data security prior to releasing
guidance is also potentially strategic.164 As previously mentioned, the
court in Wyndham placed significant value in informal guidance
documents published by the FTC.165 However, creating CFPB-specific
guidance could be problematic, as it would likely conflict with the data
security policies already listed in other examples of agency-specific
guidance.166 Scholars have noted that formal guidance is not wellsuited to address the highly dynamic nature of data security issues.167
The CFPB may therefore intentionally avoid issuing meaningful
guidance, and continue to establish precedent through enforcement
actions such as this.168 The relatively meager nature of the fine issued
to Dwolla could signal that this action was intended to serve such an
informal guidance role.169
161. See,
We
Are
Never
Done,
DWOLLA
(Mar.
2,
2016),
https://www.dwolla.com/updates/we-are-never-done/ (reaffirming that no actual data breach
has ever occurred at Dwolla); DURBIN & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3.
162. Press Release, FTC, Fandango, Credit Karma Settle FTC Charges that They
Deceived Consumers By Failing to Securely Transmit Sensitive Personal Information
(March 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/03/fandango-creditkarma-settle-ftc-charges-they-deceived-consumers.
163. Id.
164. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 256 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding
that the party could be held liable despite the lack of formal rules on cybersecurity issued by
the FTC); see also GORDON, supra note 145, at 1 (“Despite this enforcement threat, the
bureau has provided virtually no guidance on the specific data security practices it expects
companies to follow.”).
165. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 256.
166. Id.
167. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 98, at 2299.
168. See id. (establishing that previous actions put FTC covered persons on notice).
169. See
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROT.
BUREAU,
Enforcement
Actions,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/?formid=0&filter0_title=&filter0_categories=admin-filing&filter0_from_date=&filter0_to_date=.
(establishing that fines levied by the CFPB in other cases have been much much larger).
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The preventative approach to data security endorsed by the
CFPB in Dwolla may very well be the most cost-effective, long-term
solution for financial institutions.170 Studies have reinforced the notion
that proactive measures reduce overall costs.171 For example, having a
data security team in place can reduce the average cost of breach by
10%, as the company saves significant funds on costly post-breach,
third-party remediation.172 The employee training and planning
techniques endorsed in Dwolla have also been proven to reduce breach
costs.173
Companies covered by the CFPB could also benefit from
following the National Institute of Standards and Technologies
(“NIST”) framework.174 NIST is an organization housed within the
Department of Commerce, which works to provide American industry
with tools and guides that facilitate both efficiency and productivity.175
The FTC has acknowledged NIST’s framework as consistent with both
its guidance and its enforcement actions.176 At its core, the framework
has five functions: identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover.177
While these steps are broad, they encompass the notion that companies
need to be both proactive and reactive in their efforts to protect data.178
“Identify” includes using data to determine where and how different
security threats will develop.179 “Protect” includes taking proactive
steps such as increasing employee awareness, and developing security
safeguards in delivery of services.180 “Detect” concerns the
identification of attacks, and the FTC has brought many actions based

170. See PONEMON INST., 2016 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY 9 (June 2016)
(establishing that data loss prevention technologies reduce the cost of a data breach),
https://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/se/en/sel03094usen/SEL03094USEN.PDF.
171. IBM, supra note 6 at 9.
172. IBM, supra note 6, at 9.
173. IBM, supra note 6, at 9. (concluding that employee training reduces the overall
costs of a breach by 7% per capita and having BCM measures in place reduces the costs by
about 6% per capita).
174. Andrea Arias, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the FTC, F.T.C. BUS. BLOG
(Aug.
31,
2016,
6:36
PM),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/businessblog/2016/08/nist-cybersecurity-framework-ftc.
175. About NIST, NIST, https://www.nist.gov/about-nist (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
176. Arias, supra note 174.
177. Arias, supra note 174.
178. Arias, supra note 174.
179. Arias, supra note 174.
180. Arias, supra note 174.
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on companies’ failure in this area.181 Finally, “respond” and “recover”
both address the steps companies should have in place to mitigate
damage after a breach has occurred.182 Past FTC actions have stressed
the importance of consumer interests in recovery, which can include
promptly notifying customers about what information has been
compromised.183 Somewhat ironically, the CFPB’s internal data
security programs have been analyzed and held to NIST standards by
the Office of Inspector General for the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.184
Companies can also reduce their potential exposure by simply
not collecting personal information.185 While the nature of the financial
industry often necessitates the collection of such information,
companies could limit the amount of personal information by adopting
technologies such as OAuth.186 This technology provides temporary
access to personal information stored by social networking companies,
(e.g., Facebook profile information) thereby limiting the quantity of
information needed for customer registration.187
To avoid deception violations, financial institutions must be
careful when drafting privacy policies and other documents that will be
distributed to customers.188 As long as the CFPB is acting on the
deception prong alone, companies can protect themselves by avoiding
misleading security statements.189 This could be as easy as telling
consumers in disclaimers that “we cannot guarantee absolutely that your

Arias, supra note 174.
Arias, supra note 174.
Arias, supra note 174.
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM & CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, 2015 AUDIT OF THE CFPB’S INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM 11 (Nov. 2015),
https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/cfpb-2015-information-security-program-nov2015.pdf.
185. See Joel Schectman, 5 Reasons Too Much Data Can be Risky, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
10, 2014, 6:31 PM) http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/04/10/5-reasons-too-much-data-canbe-risky/ (establishing that unnecessary data collection posses a variety of dangers including
increased exposure to hackers and possible damage to public perception when the scope of
data collection is revealed).
186. OAuth is a security protocol that allows users to login and provide access to
information that they provided another online service provider (e.g., “Login with
Facebook”). Changhun Oh, Dancing with OAuth: Understanding how Authorization Works,
http://www.cubrid.org/blog/dev-platform/dancing-with-oauthCUBRID (2012),
understanding-how-authorization-works/.
187. Id.
188. TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 1.
189. TAYLOR, supra note 99.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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information will never be subject to a breach.”190 If companies prefer to
make a guarantee about data security, they should avoid grandiose
statements such as those made by Dwolla, as these are far more likely to
be flagged for possible deception.191 This implicates a balancing act
where companies must craft statements that give their customers
sufficient confidence, while not creating liability.192 Attorneys in the
field have noted that to be taken seriously, companies must at least
portray that their policies meet industry standards.193
Shortly after the CFPB’s enforcement action, Dwolla published
a blog post about its data security policies entitled “We Are Never
Done.”194 In the post, Dwolla concedes that “we may not have chosen
the best language and comparisons to describe some of our
capabilities,” and that “it has never been the company’s intent to
mislead anyone on critical issues like data security.”195 Dwolla also
emphasized that its customers’ accounts have never been breached.196
The post concludes with a brief description of the encryption methods
utilized by Dwolla, including a promise that Dwolla will never stop
pursuing security for customers.197
V. CONCLUSION
Agency focus on data security is likely to grow as the threat and
scope of cyber attacks increase.198 The CFPB is not the first to police
data security, but the agency’s strong enforcement tools and focus on
consumer protection make it a formidable regulator.199 While the
Dwolla consent order provides some useful guidance, uncertainty
remains the prevailing theme. The decision to bring action against
TAYLOR, supra note 99.
TAYLOR, supra note 99.
See TAYLOR, supra note 99 (asserting that in light of the Dwolla consent order
companies must be extremely careful when determining the scope of their privacy
statements).
193. TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 1.
194. Dwolla, supra note 161.
195. Dwolla, supra note 161.
196. Dwolla, supra note 161.
197. Dwolla, supra note 161; At the time of this writing, Dwolla’s website included the
less aggressive claim that it is working with “top security industry professionals to build and
maintain the platform, and keep customer information secure.” Dwolla, supra note 161.
198. TAYLOR, supra note 99.
199. DURBIN & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3.
190.
191.
192.
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Dwolla may have been strategic, but without further enforcement
actions it is impossible to discern the CFPB’s regulatory priorities in
this field.200 The election of President Donald J. Trump has created
further uncertainty, as his administration has expressed plans to make
broad changes to the CFPB’s personnel.201 Until clarification is
provided in the form of further enforcement actions or guidance,
financial institutions should utilize both FTC precedent and the Dwolla
consent order to assess the adequacy of their data security policies.202
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